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Although the ideal of living in a democratic polity has reverber-
ated throughout history at least since the ancient Greeks, it was only 
in the last decade of the twentieth century that the political climate 
became propitious for democratic change in most parts of the world.1 
Indeed, the lesson of the early 1990s was that the demise of the Cold 
War attested to the victory of liberal democracy over totalitarianism 
and that for millions of people, the door was now open to economic 
prosperity and political affirmation.2 This sense of optimism was pres-
ent in the realms of both policy-making and academia: U.S. President 
George H.W. Bush stood before Congress and declared his intentions 
to help forge a New World Order “in which the nations of the world, 
East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony.”3 
Two years before this speech, Francis Fukuyama had written that the 
dialectics of history would cease and a democratic peace based on lib-
eral values would result from the struggle between individualism and 
communism.4
Yet, as we well know, from East to West and from North to South, 
these lofty expectations were hit hard. The Balkans succumbed to a spi-
ral of violence reminiscent of the Second World War. AIDS, genocide, 
and civil war ravaged parts of Africa and an economic crisis took hold 
of South Asia and Latin America. Moreover, the attacks of September 
11, 2001, introduced the threat of global terrorism. Thus, even though a 
democratic peace took root in Europe and its promises became a tangi-
21
Macalester International  Vol. 20
22
ble reality for millions on the continent, a wider perspective shows that 
the tenets of realism—with its emphasis on anarchy, sovereignty, and 
national interest—might have possessed greater explanatory power. 
As a result, the democratic peace thesis could have been perceived 
with much greater skepticism.
However, faith in democracy was not lost and promoting democ-
racy continued to be a common objective for both the United States 
and the European Union (EU). In 1990, the Transatlantic Declaration 
stated that the first goal for the U.S. and the EU (then the European 
Community) was to “support democracy, the rule of law and respect 
for human rights worldwide.”5 Five years later, the EU and the U.S. 
adopted the New Transatlantic Agenda, which reaffirmed this creed 
and aimed to “seize the opportunity presented by Europe’s historic 
transformation to consolidate democracy and free-market economies 
throughout the continent.”6 Even in 2006, with Iraq war discord still 
fresh, both the U.S. and the EU agreed that, “the advance of democracy 
is a strategic priority of our age.”7
In spite of this consensus in principle, the practicalities of advanc-
ing democracy have proven to be a divisive issue. Far from being the 
symptoms of an episodic divide, the arguments over Iraq reflect dif-
ferent conceptions of the world and of the role of external agency in 
enacting political change. The roots of this divergence can be traced 
back notably to 9/11 and to the distinct conclusions that American and 
European leaders drew from this event. For U.S. President George 
W. Bush, the international arena has once again turned into a battle-
ground between the forces of freedom and tyranny, except now “the 
survival of liberty in our land [America] depends on the success of 
liberty in other lands.”8 Hence, promoting democracy by any means 
goes hand in hand with increasing America’s security. In European 
eyes, however, the world since September 11 is not necessarily more 
dangerous but more complex, and the task of promoting democracy 
must be addressed within the intricate context shaped by the process 
of globalization.9
Whether or not these disagreements will again manifest themselves 
as profoundly as they did at the United Nations Security Council in 
2003 remains to be seen. What is far less elusive is the hypothesis that 
studying the approaches that the U.S. and EU take towards democra-
tization is a useful way of understanding what factors determine the 
extent to which their policies may converge or diverge in the future. 
With this motivation in mind, the purpose of this essay is twofold. On 
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the one hand, I seek to analyze how the way in which democracy pro-
motion is presented in official American and European security docu-
ments differs from the political processes through which democracy is 
bolstered and advanced. From a methodological perspective, this task 
faces a serious challenge: while the U.S. is a unitary and coherent actor 
in global politics, the EU is a fragmented association of states whose 
policies are simultaneously supra-national (trade), shared (develop-
ment), and intergovernmental (security). The question arises of what 
constitutes EU foreign policy? Is it the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) established under Pillar II of the Treaty of Maastricht? Is 
it the EU’s external relations, supervised by the European Commission, 
or just the foreign policies of member states? Since this essay is con-
cerned with the promotion of democracy as a Union-wide endeavor, 
focusing on just one domain of EU activity may overlook important 
efforts that are being pursued in others. Therefore, even though my 
attention will concentrate primarily on the CFSP, the European Neigh-
borhood Policy (ENP) and other initiatives will also be taken into con-
sideration.
Secondly, this study is the culmination of my intellectual parcours 
as a participant in the seminar on Globalization in Comparative Per-
spective, the purpose of which was to explore the many facets of this 
concept through both experiential learning acquired by living in the 
United States and Europe, and a rigorous academic engagement. 
Therefore, part of the rationale behind this project is to underscore 
how researching the theme of this essay and developing an argument 
about democracy promotion has contributed to my understanding of 
globalization.
The essay continues as follows: Section I compares and contrasts the 
2006 National Security Strategy of the United States with the European 
Security Strategy, which was presented to the European Council in 
2003 by CFSP special representative Javier Solana. My purpose here 
is to answer three questions: (a) what are the most serious threats to 
international peace and security according to each document, (b) how 
does the promotion of democracy fit within the broader framework 
of policy recommendations offered to tackle these problems, and (c) 
in what kind of language are these documents written (do technical 
terms prevail over ideological formulations or vice-versa)? Section II 
turns to a case study and explores the policies that the U.S. and EU 
have adopted towards Hamas since it won the Palestinian municipal 
and legislative elections in January 2006. This focus is relevant for 
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two reasons. First, the EU is involved (together with the U.S., Rus-
sian Federation and the United Nations) in the Middle East Quartet, 
thus reflecting a Union-wide effort to contribute to the resolution of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Second and most significantly, Hamas’ 
victory is a classical example of the democratic paradox. On the one 
hand, the Palestinian people voted Hamas into government in free and 
fair elections; on the other hand, this organization is labeled “terrorist” 
by both the U.S. and the EU. Hamas explicitly refuses to acknowledge 
Israel’s right to exist and denies the legitimacy of the political agree-
ments signed by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). All 
of this makes its agenda incompatible with the principles enumerated 
in the Quartet’s Roadmap to Peace. In this context, my aim is to inves-
tigate to what extent the policy prescriptions outlined in the afore-
mentioned documents were implemented and, if they were not, what 
are the consequences for both the U.S. and EU. Section III combines 
analysis with reflection in order to bring to light the contradictions of 
democracy-promotion strategies and offer an evaluation of the U.S. 
and EU initiatives analyzed in Section II. Finally, in Section IV, the 
emphasis will be on the specific ways in which my interaction with 
this subject has enhanced my understanding of globalization. These 
thoughts shall serve as a general conclusion.
II. Two Security Strategies
Before I begin the comparison between the National Security Strategy 
of the United States (NSS) and the European Security Strategy (ESS), 
two points of qualification are required. First, it can be argued that it 
might have been more useful to treat the NSS and ESS separately in 
order to highlight more clearly the findings of my analysis conducted 
in the first semester of the program in the United States and in the sec-
ond semester in Europe. However, such an approach would have over-
looked a crucial aspect, namely, that the development of the ESS was 
heavily influenced by the original iteration of the NSS in 2002. Con-
sequently, analyzing what these policy frameworks have to say about 
promoting democracy—the central phenomenon with which this essay 
is concerned—in relation to one another is an exercise that can lead to 
much more accurate results.
The reference to the 2002 NSS brings me to my second point. 
Although in this essay the most recent version of the National Security 
Strategy takes precedence, a rigorous analysis cannot treat it in isola-
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tion from its initial formulation in 2002. The reason is that the 2002 NSS 
was the first document in which the Bush Administration outlined 
how it would address the threats America faced post-9/11, and its core 
assumptions still inform the most recent version.
A. Visions of Danger: The NSS and the ESS
How do American and European policymakers perceive the world at 
the onset of the new millennium? One may begin by noting that the 
NSS (both in 2002 and 2006) and the ESS have two radically different 
historical points of departure. For the NSS, the twentieth century was 
marked by the confrontation between democracy and totalitarianism, 
and “ended with the decisive victory of the forces of freedom and a 
single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy and 
free enterprise.”10 Consequently, today the United States has a privi-
leged hegemonic position in the international system, which is main-
tained by faith in the values of a free and open society, but which also 
implies the exceptional responsibility of defending those principles 
because they enjoy universal validity.11 With respect to the threats that 
the U.S. faces in the wake of 9/11, President Bush declares in his intro-
ductory remarks to the 2002 NSS that, “the gravest danger our Nation 
faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology.”12 Specifically, 
the enemy is terrorism and the struggle against it is perceived as a new 
kind of existential battle for the United States, which will be fought 
over an extended period of time.13 Yet terrorism is far from being a 
solitary danger. To the contrary, it comes in a triad with rogue regimes 
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) because 
“we must stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are 
able to use them against the United States.”14
The same sense of great danger and opportunity permeates the 
2006 NSS. Writing three years after the war in Iraq begun, the Presi-
dent is unambivalent in his introductory letter about the current state 
of affairs in the U.S.: “America is at war” and the NSS is “a wartime 
strategy required by the grave challenge we face: the rise of terrorism, 
fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder.”15 In compari-
son to its predecessor, the NSS is formulated on the same basic tenets 
and identifies the same threats, but differs in at least two respects: (1) 
each section contains a brief progress report with the successes and 
challenges since 2002, which includes details about Al-Qaeda, Afghan-
istan, and Iraq; and (2) it addresses a serious shortcoming of the 2002 
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NSS, namely, that in spite of the “significance attributed to terrorism, 
there is little [in the document] to actually help the reader understand 
the nature of the terrorist threat and how it might be addressed.”16 In 
contrast, the 2006 version identifies four reasons that explain the rise 
of global terrorism. Two of them are ideological and refer to (a) the 
rhetoric of historical injustices, which are constantly revived in order 
to fuel the thirst for revenge, and (b) the perversion of Islam as a reli-
gion in order to justify the killing of innocents. The other two attribute 
the rise of global terrorism to the lack of democracy, as terrorists are 
(c) recruited from groups of individuals with no political voice in their 
societies and (d) belong to socio-political milieus devoid of transpar-
ency, since the worldview of the groups that suicide bombers come 
from is distorted by conspiracy theories and false information.17
If the tone and content of the NSS betray the deep sense of alarm 
caused by the threat of global terrorism, rogue regimes, and weapons 
of mass destruction, the ESS, while fully cognizant of these dangers, 
paints a different picture of the world. To begin with, the historical 
reference point for this document is not the Cold War and the vic-
tory of freedom over totalitarianism, but the success story of Euro-
pean integration. Indeed, the first sentence of the ESS proclaims that, 
“Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free” and that 
“the creation of the European Union has been central to this devel-
opment.”18 Whereas the NSS credits America’s unparalleled political 
status in the world to its attachment to democratic values, the ESS 
focuses on Europe’s unavoidable mission of becoming a more proac-
tive international actor: “As a union of 25 [now 27] states with over 450 
million people and a quarter of the world’s GNP, the EU is inevitably a 
global player” and “should be ready to share in the responsibility for 
a global security and in building a better world.”19 Therefore, a critical 
distinction between the NSS and the ESS is that the former is written 
in the language of actuality—the U.S. is the world’s sole superpower 
and must protect its security—whereas the latter is formulated in the 
language of potentiality: the EU should come to terms with its weight 
as a top player in the world arena and make its presence felt more 
strongly.
This point is perhaps best illustrated in the way in which the ESS 
discusses the main threats to international peace and security. Unlike 
the NSS, it “acknowledges the existence of threats, but they are por-
trayed as issues that have to be taken seriously since Europe could be 
confronted by a radical challenge.”20 Specifically, the sources for these 
Paul Maximilian Bisca
27
radical challenges include terrorism, for which Europe serves both as a 
target and as a base, and the proliferation of WMD, regarded as poten-
tially the greatest threat to the EU’s security. The ESS recognizes that, 
“the most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire 
weapons of mass destruction.”21 Regional conflicts, whether violent 
or frozen, persist at the Union’s borders and threaten it in both direct 
and indirect ways. Another threat is “state failure,” which differs from 
the American notion of “rogue states,” although the same countries 
are under scrutiny, such as Somalia or Afghanistan under the Taliban. 
Interestingly enough (and without giving examples), the ESS mentions 
“a number of states that have placed themselves outside the bounds 
of international society,”22 and who are only encouraged to rejoin the 
international community.23 A final problem is organized crime, a multi-
faceted threat that challenges the EU’s internal stability.
B. Democracy: A Recipe against All Evils?
America and Europe have prepared different responses for the per-
ils that put their security at risk. For the United States, the antidote 
against these ills is not difficult to conceive, for if the Cold War ended 
with the victory of democracy over dictatorship, and if the same battle 
is being fought now in a different guise, it follows that the only win-
ning answer is a genuine commitment to promote democracy. Indeed, 
the first paragraph of the 2002 NSS declares that the “values of freedom 
are right and true for every person, in every society—and the duty of 
protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling 
of freedom-loving people across the globe.”24 Based on this assump-
tion, the purpose of American “statecraft is to help create a world of 
democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citi-
zens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system” 
because doing so is “the best way to provide enduring security for the 
American people.”25 In other words, the United States embraces the 
thesis of democratic peace for both idealistic and strategic reasons. 
According to the 2006 NSS, since “democracies are the most responsi-
ble members of the of the international system, promoting democracy 
is the most effective long-term measure for strenghtening international 
stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering terrorism; and extend-
ing peace and prosperity.”26
Surveying the policy recommendations that the 2006 NSS advocates 
in order to effectively tackle terrorism is a good way to understand how 
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this philosophy is to be applied. I mentioned that the document identi-
fies four factors that explain the growing magnitude of this phenome-
non. To each of them, the NSS claims that the promotion of democracy 
offers an effective solution. For instance, in place of political alienation, 
“democracy offers an ownership stake in society” and “a chance to 
shape one’s own future.”27 With respect to conspiracy and misinfor-
mation, democracy allows for “freedom of speech and an indepen-
dent media which can expose and discredit dishonest propaganda.” 
Regarding the calls for violent revenge against historical injustices and 
the perversion of Islam to legitimize suicide bombing, “democracy 
offers the peaceful resolution of disputes and the respect for human 
dignity that abhors the deliberate targeting of innocent civilians.” Con-
sequently, all the instruments required to fight these evils appear to be 
embedded in the fabric of democratic societies, which the U.S. seeks 
to sustain and advance through a variety of means, ranging from pub-
lic diplomacy to development aid, military assistance, and working 
within the framework of international organizations.
Before I move on to discuss the ESS, two prescriptions of the NSS 
should be kept in mind, given their relevance to the purpose of this 
essay. First, although the document states that “freedom cannot be 
imposed, but must be chosen,” it qualifies this assertion by noting that 
while in some cases the U.S. “will lend more quiet support to lay the 
foundations of freedom,” in others it will “take vocal and visible steps 
on behalf of immediate [my emphasis] change.”28 Second, both the 2002 
and the 2006 NSS documents make specific references to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. In the former version, it is mentioned that, “there 
can be no peace for either side without freedom for both sides” and 
that “America stands committed to an independent and democratic 
Palestinian state living beside Israel in peace and security.”29 In the lat-
ter document, however, the language is less abstract and the focus is 
on Hamas’ responsibilities as an elected governing party in the Pales-
tinian territories. Although elections are the most visible sign of a free 
and democratic society, only a commitment by Hamas to the equality 
of all citizens, minority rights, civil liberties, and the peaceful resolu-
tion of disputes would make it a legitimate political actor. Otherwise, 
this “government cannot be considered fully democratic, however it 
might have taken office.”30 I will return to these points in the following 
section.
The ESS is less alarmist about the threats to Europe’s security and 
its remedies are equally reflective of its perceptions. For the U.S., what 
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is at stake in the fight against terrorism is the survival of democracy 
in the world, which is synonymous with boosting America’s security. 
The EU, while acknowledging that the line of defense against these 
new perils will often be abroad, sees no clear-cut answers to these 
complex and interconnected problems. On the contrary, responding 
to each threat requires a mixture of various instruments. For exam-
ple, combating terrorism effectively is impossible without combining 
“intelligence, police, judicial and other means.”31 Proliferation may 
be “contained through export controls and attacked through political, 
economic and other pressures,” while simultaneously “tackling the 
underlying political causes.”32 Most importantly, given that in the era 
of globalization geography still matters, Europe is concerned with the 
security of its vicinity. In this regard, the ESS stipulates that, “our task 
is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the Union 
and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy 
close and cooperative relations.”33 This is a crucial difference with the 
NSS, which clearly states that, “it is the policy of the United States 
to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every 
nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our 
world.”34 In contrast, the EU recognizes that, “spreading good gover-
nance [and not democracy!], supporting political reform, dealing with 
corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and pro-
tecting human rights are the best means of strenghtening international 
order.”35 Hence, in this document the EU strives to foster good gover-
nance and political reform in order to create a cordon sanitaire around 
its borders. Whenever the promotion of democracy is mentioned, it is 
done within the context of European integration,36 and not specifically 
as a goal to be advanced in its relations with other international actors.
The plan to operationalize this objective differs both in scope and in 
substance from that of the NSS. While the U.S. strategy (both in 2002 
and 2006) is “truly global in its outlook” and takes on “an interna-
tional mandate to expand the benefits of freedom around the globe,”37 
the ESS’ area of concentration is regional, even though the title of the 
document, “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” reflects Europe’s aim 
to make its normative aspirations more prominent. Most importantly, 
both documents hope to spread democracy (the NSS) and good gover-
nance (the ESS) in cooperation with other partners, but while the U.S. 
relies on a distinct brand of American internationalism that combines 
values and national interests in order to forge an alliance of freedom-
loving nations against terror,38 the EU’s plan is to build an international 
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order based on effective multilateralism. This strategy is inspired by 
the the history of EU integration and implies upholding the norms 
of international law, working within the framework of international 
institutions like the U.N., and making use of policy instruments related 
to trade, assistance, and conditionality.39 Furthermore, this reflects the 
belief that in a globalized world, “there are few problems we can deal 
with on our own.”40 In contrast, the NSS is fully confident in the power 
of America to fulfill its global mission. In other words, while for the EU 
cooperation is intrinsic to successfully tackling the threats to Europe’s 
security, for the U.S. cooperation has become instrumentalized and is 
contingent upon the context in which democracy must be promoted.41 
As previously mentioned, the 2006 NSS declares that while America’s 
principles are firm, its tactics will vary.
Two further points regarding the ESS are worthy of attention. First, 
just like the NSS, the European document devotes some space to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, the focus is not on the quintes-
sential role that democracy can play in finding a peaceful settlement, 
but on the relevance of the Israeli-Palestinian question to the larger 
problems that haunt the region and on the importance of international 
cooperation. For Europe, “the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is 
a strategic priority” without which “there will be little chance of deal-
ing with the other problems of the Middle East.”42 To this end, the 
two-state solution that Europe has long advocated requires a “united 
effort by the European Union, United States, the United Nations and 
Russia [all members of the Middle East Quartet], but above all by 
Israelis and Palestinians.”43 Secondly, although the ESS mentions inter-
vention only in the context of failing states and as a potential option 
that might be exploited in the future,44 the final lines of the document 
refer to the EU-U.S. relationship and declare that “acting together, the 
European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good 
[my emphasis] in the world.”45 Thus, while Europe does not seek to 
promote good governance and reform in a forceful manner, the mili-
tary option does not seem to disappear entirely from the toolbox that 
Europe is intent on having at its disposal if it is to play a greater role in 
international politics.
C. Languages of Democracy
When it comes to the promotion of democracy, the NSS and the ESS 
remain different in both form and content. In the former, democracy is 
Paul Maximilian Bisca
31
presented as a universal value that America must defend at all cost. The 
NSS does not define the concept, but takes for granted the presump-
tion that it enjoys universal validity. In fact, the word “democracy” 
appears fifty-two times in the 54-page 2006 document; additionally, the 
word “freedom” appears in eighty instances and “liberty” in twenty-
two. Consequently, it is difficult for the reader not to get a sense that 
far more than being a security strategy, the NSS is in reality a creed, an 
enumeration of the articles of faith that guide the post-9/11 political 
agenda of the United States. In contrast, in the ESS the word “democ-
racy” appears three times, the word “freedom” twice, and the concept 
of governance (good, bad, or global) five times in a document about a 
third the length of the NSS. In terms of language, the ESS is far more 
technical and, as we have seen in the example of terrorism, its prescrip-
tions are less normative.
One explanation for why this is the case may be that since the EU is 
a supranational organization of 27 states, it is much more difficult for 
a particular school of thought to impose a dogmatic understanding of 
the role democracy plays in tackling the threats confronting the Union. 
In the U.S., after each election the winning party can translate its politi-
cal vision into reality without too many structural hindrances, except 
for the checks and balances enshrined in the Constitution. In contradis-
tinction, policy-making in the EU is a process of constant deliberation 
and decision by consensus in the European Council, which means that 
political formulae must be pallatable to all member states. Since fram-
ing policy in technical terms makes it easier to fulfill this requirement, 
it is not surprising that the ESS is much more concise and its language 
less ideological. I will explore whether or not this is a strength in the 
third section of this essay.
If the difference between the U.S. goal of spreading democracy and 
the EU’s purpose of spreading good governance seems blurry, the com-
ments of Europe’s CFSP representative, Javier Solana, may give us 
more insight. According to him, “in the Middle East and elsewhere, 
democratic change is a long term process” and “to succeed, demo-
cratic movements have to be home-grown and adapted to local condi-
tions,” as each society “must find its own path and move forward at 
its own pace.”46 What outside actors can do is “to help create a context 
conducive to political change” and “once change is under way, they 
can support and reward reformist forces.” This differs sharply from 
the American notion that while in some cases the U.S. will only lend 
passive support for the democratic agenda, in others it will push for 
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immediate change. In addition, Solana believes that a culture of dia-
logue with regional partners can be more effective than coercion or 
isolation. He advocates for Europe to use its “sticky” power to “attract, 
stabilize and transform,” because close cooperation with Middle East-
ern countries enables the EU to raise concerns over the direction and 
speed of political change. On the basis of his experience, Solana writes 
that, “often a quiet word about the plight of a dissident can have 
more impact than a high-profile speech.” His philosopy reflects the 
EU’s complexity as a diplomatic actor that relies primarily on struc-
tural foreign policy based on a more general conception of power. This 
approach focuses on milieu goals and on the capacity of states or enti-
ties to “determine the structure, rules and institutions in which other 
states operate;” it has “real impact only in the long term.”47 Addition-
ally, in formulating and implementing its policies, the EU separates 
the discourse of justification (i.e., good governance and the rule of law 
were responsbile for the success of EU integration and should be pro-
moted worldwide) from the discourse of application (the EU should 
pay attention to the local “color” of the places where these policies are 
to be implemented).48 Although the NSS specifies that America’s prin-
ciples of promoting democracy are firm and only its tactics will vary, as 
we shall see below this claim can be disputed.
Having analyzed the nature of the security threats delineated by the 
NSS and the ESS, and the way in which democracy fits within the stra-
tegic recommendations of each document both at the level of policy 
and language, my attention shall now turn to the Israeli-Palestinian 
context. My aim is to see how this analysis can explain the U.S. and EU 
reactions to the recent evolution of this conflict.
III. Hamas and the Disappointments of Democracy
At the moment when these pages were freshly written, the political 
situation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank was desperate. The unity 
government formed after the Mecca agreement of February 8, 2007, 
between Fatah and Hamas, was on the fringes of collapse under the 
weight of internecine fighting between groups loyal to either party. 
Forty people had lost their lives and 114 had been wounded.49 Today 
the context is equally volatile. The Annapolis summit between Israeli 
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President Mahmoud 
Abbas (Abu Mazen), which was moderated by American President 
George W. Bush, ended on December 4, 2007, with the promise that 
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a Palestinian state alongside Israel would be established by the end 
of 2008. Yet hardliners on both sides did not pay much attention to 
this development. A Hamas spokesman declared that Annapolis could 
never produce the kind of state Palestinians wish for and, meanwhile, 
security forces loyal to Abu Mazen shot dead a Hamas demonstrator 
on the West Bank. As for the Israelis, their lack of vocal protest high-
lighted their skepticism about the plans drawn up in Annapolis.50
A key element in understanding why this crisis is so difficult to 
negotiate is the reaction of the U.S. and EU to the victory of Hamas in 
the legislative elections of January 25, 2006, and in the municipal elec-
tions that were held in three rounds during the year 2005. In this case, 
democracy brought into government an organization that both the U.S. 
and EU had blacklisted for terrorism. To further explore the implica-
tions of this paradox, this section will first outline the American and 
European efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East and specifi-
cally in the Palestinian territories. Second, I will examine why and how 
the Hamas victory came about. Third, I will scrutinize the American 
and European policies adopted in response to this development, as 
well as discuss their impact for the overall task of advancing democ-
racy and good governance.
A. America, Europe, and Middle East Democracy
I begin with the observation that American programs to spread democ-
racy in the Middle East are designed to operate on three levels: first, 
there are policy initiatives that support civil society organizations and 
state institutions with the underlying goal of fostering democratic 
change. The main American effort in this effort has been the 2002 
Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), which was informed by 
the U.N.’s Arab Human Development Report, released earlier that year. 
According to that publication, the lack of political freedom, the disem-
powerment of women, and the lack of knowledge are key factors that 
account for the current state of the Arab world.51 In addition, the U.S. 
government announced at the 2004 G-8 summit held in Atlanta, Geor-
gia, the launching of the Broader Middle East and North Africa Part-
nership Initiative (BMENA). Just like the MEPI, it was programmed 
with the view of encouraging democratic political reform, economic 
liberalization, more support for education, and women’s rights. The 
difference is that the BMENA included countries such as Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. For the fiscal year 2005, Congress allocated a total of $150 
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million for the MEPI (about $300 million was originally reserved for 
four fiscal years) and $75 million for the BMENA.52 So far, these pro-
grams have sponsored more than 100 projects in fourteen countries.53 
The second level at which the U.S. directs its democracy promotion 
strategy is that of public diplomacy, as neither President Bush, nor 
Vice-President Cheney, nor Secretary of State Rice have failed to under-
score the vital importance of democracy to U.S. foreign policy.54 As we 
have seen, this philosophy is the bedrock of the NSS. Finally, in line 
with the NSS, the third level of U.S. democracy promotion strategies is 
that of military intervention, which is presently taking place in Iraq.55
For a number of reasons, the case of Palestine is particularly crucial 
for U.S. democracy promotion efforts. When compared to the approach 
the U.S. has taken towards countries like Egypt and Jordan (key Amer-
ican allies in the region), the American demand for democratic change 
has been much more forceful towards the Palestinians and has been 
articulated in tandem with security objectives.56 Most importantly, the 
U.S. has made Palestine a test case for the spread of democracy in 
the Middle East. In 2002, President Bush declared that, “if liberty can 
blossom on the rocky soil of the West Bank and Gaza, it will inspire 
millions around the globe who are equally weary of poverty and 
oppression” and “equally entitled to the benefits of democratic gov-
ernment.”57 Consequently, until 2006 and Hamas’ electoral success, 
the U.S. was the largest individual donor to the Palestinian Legislative 
Council, providing training for 80% of Palestinian parliamentarians. 
American programs focused on consolidating the Palestinian judiciary, 
providing grants to strengthen citizens’ rights, and technical assistance 
for elections. All these initiatives were channeled through the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), as the MEPI 
has not yet carried out significant programs in the West Bank or Gaza 
Strip.58 Financially, this has translated into an overall commitment of 
$150 million in the fiscal year 2005, out of which half was appropriated 
by Congress to USAID projects in Gaza and the West Bank.59 Also in 
2005, following a visit to Washington by Palestinian Authority (PA) 
President Mahmoud Abbas, President Bush approved a cash transfer 
of $50 million in direct assistance to the PA.60
I will turn now to EU strategy. Promoting good governance and 
reform in the Arab world in general and in the Palestinian Territories 
in particular illustrate not only the crucial role played by the rule of 
law within the internal policy framework of the EU, but most impor-
tantly the degree to which the experiences of enlargement and integra-
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tion inform the Union’s course of action. According to Article 11(1) 
of the Treaty for European Union (TEU), the EU shall “define and 
implement a common foreign and security policy…the objectives of 
which shall be to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of 
law and respect for human rights and fundalental freedoms.”61 Simi-
larly, Articles 177(2) and 181a(1) of the Treaty for European Commu-
nity orient the EU’s development and economic strategies in the same 
direction.62 Moreover, in 1993, the EU established the Copenhagen cri-
teria for membership, which stipulated that functional institutions that 
guarantee the rule of law and respect for human rights were a sine qua 
non for any country planning for accession. Finally, In 1998, the Union 
issued a declaration on human rights in which it proclaimed that, “the 
indivisibility for human rights and the promotion of pluralistic democ-
racy serve as a fundamental basis for action.”63 Thus, an initial obser-
vation about the EU’s democracy promotion strategies is that from 
1992, when the TEU was signed, until 2003, when the European Coun-
cil adopted the ESS, spreading democracy as a foreign policy objective 
was gradually replaced with spreading good governance. The follow-
ing section will delve into some of the reasons that may have trigerred 
this decision.
In 1994, the European Parliament launched the European Initia-
tive for Democracy and Human Rights, which is anually funded at 
circa 130 million Euros for projects worldwide, of which 10 percent 
go to countries in the Middle East.64 In 1995, the EU launched the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), which established a structure 
for cooperation with twelve countries littoral to the Mediterranean. 
This program was based on the Barcelona Declaration, which divides 
cooperation into political, economic, and cultural areas, and is opera-
tionalized through association agreements in which signatories are 
obliged to endorse a human rights clause. From 2000 to 2006, the EMP 
was allocated one billion Euros.65 Finally, in 2003, the EU started the 
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), a new scheme that was clearly 
inspired by the provisions of the ESS. Its purpose was to promote a 
“zone of prosperity” around Europe. It was structured in a series of 
differentiated action plans covering key areas such as political reform, 
economic development, trade, and justice and home affairs.66
The Palestinian Authority was invited to join the ENP in 2003. Under 
the “democracy and rule of law priorities,” the EU and PA agreed 
to work together on strengthening the legitimacy of the Palestinian 
Legislative Council, regulating political parties, assisting in local elec-
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tions, and making the public administration more transparent.67 In 
2005, the European Commission directed the Union’s financial com-
mitments in two areas: (1) “support for the PA, including reforms” (70 
million Euros), with Europe being the primary donor in to the Palestin-
ian Financial Management Trust Fund supervised by the World Bank; 
and (2) “building the institutions of the Palestinian state” (12 million 
Euros), which mainly focused on creating the conditions for an eco-
nomic recovery for Gaza and the West Bank.68
B. Enter Hamas
The comprehensive programs to promote democracy (and good gov-
ernance) managed by the U.S. and EU came to a halt in the wake of 
Hamas’ success in the Palestinian elections. To better fathom why this 
was the case, a minimal discussion of Hamas’ identity is required. Cre-
ated between 1987 and 1993 during the first Intifada in Gaza and the 
West Bank, Hamas is an offspring of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. 
Article 11 of its Charter proclaims that, “the land of Palestine belongs 
to future Muslim generations until Judgment Day,” while Article 34 
insists that liberation from Israel can only be fulfilled by jihad.69 When 
the PA was formed in 1994 after the Oslo Accords, Hamas considered it 
to be an illegitimate body, not least because it was dominated by Fatah, 
the organization created in the 1950s by Yasir Arafat. Furthermore, 
Hamas continued the uprising and on April 13, 1994, it carried out its 
first suicide bombing in the north of Israel, killing eight people.70 Two 
years later, Hamas boycotted the PA presidential and legislative elec-
tions, which were won by Fatah and Arafat.
In 2000, the second Intifada brought Fatah and Hamas into a rela-
tionship of both competition and cooperation. Both organizations sup-
ported the unilateral ceasefire that was declared in 2003.71 One year 
later, Fatah and Hamas lost their founding figures: both Yasir Arafat 
and Sheikh Ahmad Yasin died in 2004, the former in a Paris clinic, the 
latter as a result of Israel’s policy of targeted assassinations against 
leaders of Palestinian terror groups. In fact, by the time Prime Minister 
Ariel Sharon implemented the unilateral disengagement plan from 
Gaza in August 2005, most of Hamas’ leadership had been annihilated 
by the Israeli Defense Forces.72 Following Arafat’s death, Mahmoud 
Abbas (Abu Mazen) was smoothly elected as PA president. Unlike his 
predecessor, he adopted a policy of dialogue vis-à-vis Hamas, which 
was also eager to offer a positive response, given that Israel’s policies 
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had severely weakened the movement. Consequently, on March 19, 
2005, all Palestinian factions signed the Cairo Declaration in which the 
unlilateral ceasefire was prolonged and pledges were made to start 
discussions about the integration of Hamas into the PLO. In the eyes 
of Hamas supporters, this signified that, “many things have changed,” 
for unlike Arafat, Abu Mazen “believes in democracy and has allowed 
Hamas to become more and more involved [my emphasis].73
One of the most crucial decisions taken by Abu Mazen was to post-
pone the Palestinian legislative elections (which Arafat had promised 
shortly before his death) to early 2006, and organize the municipal 
elections throughout 2005 in various rounds. The rationale behind this 
plan was that given Israel’s pullout from Gaza, Hamas had gained 
considerable prominence and holding the elections on schedule would 
result in an Islamist victory, with the next Palestinian Prime Minister 
being a Hamas member. This scenario was unacceptable to Abu Mazen, 
but most importantly to the American administration, who expected 
that a postponement would allow enough time for Fatah to consoli-
date and gain a better position.74 Indeed, the Palestinian President 
was certain about the validity of this prognosis and so were American 
officials. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared that, “we have 
to give Palestinians some room for their the evolution of their political 
process.”75 Speaking days before the legislative elections were held, an 
American official bluntly asked himself:
What would we gain by pushing forward for another postponement in 
the hope that somehow Hamas can be curbed? Six months from now, 
the PA will not be any stronger, Fatah will be just as divided, nothing 
will be done about Hamas and our democratization agenda would have 
been stalled. Elections may not produce anything better, but they won’t 
produce anything worse.76
We may note in this assessment a contradiction between the unquali-
fied way in which democracy is presented in the NSS as a “good” of 
intrinsic value that must be promoted by the U.S. worldwide, versus 
the instrumental perspective through which the Bush Administration 
evaluated the possible results from the Palestinian polls.
Contrary to these anticipations, municipal elections were held 
throughout 2005 and as the January 2006 general elections date 
approached, Hamas got stronger and stronger, while Fatah’s popular-
ity plummeted. By December 2005, Fatah was in disarray. Hamas, on 
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the other hand, was enjoying a surge in the polls that guaranteed the 
sympathy of 40 percent of Palestinians. In the first round of municipal 
elections, Hamas won 26 council seats against 12 for Fatah in the West 
Bank and seven out of nine in the Gaza Strip. By the third round, this 
pattern was confirmed.77 Even Hamas was surprised by its perfor-
mance, proclaiming that angels must have joined the vote.78
Why were Palestinians voting for Hamas? At least three reasons 
come to mind. First, during the last years of Arafat and even within 
the period of Abu Mazen’s chairmanship, the PA had been perceived 
largely as a corrupt body. Fatah was running the PA, hence Fatah’s 
association with corruption was unbreakable. Second, there was con-
sensus among the Palestinians that the Olso Peace Process, led by 
Fatah, had failed to deliver on its promises, because during the past fif-
teen years, Israel had maintained colonization and even started build-
ing a separation wall.79 Third, with Abu Mazen’s rescheduling of the 
elections, Hamas gained considerable experience in communicating 
its political message to the voters. The movement ran under the slogan 
“Change and Reform.” Its organizers became experts at holding ralies 
and enjoyed a virtual monopoly on campaigning in mosques.80 Conse-
quently, on January 25, 2006, Hamas won a decisive victory over Fatah 
and Ismael Haniya became Prime Minister, a position that was first 
held by Abu Mazen in 2005, when it was created in order to counter-
weight the Presidency, then occupied by Yasir Arafat.
C. A Dream Defered? America and Europe Respond
The response to Hamas’ electoral triumph was swift and unapologetic. 
First, Israel rejected from the very beginning the notion that Hamas 
should be integrated and argued against its participation in the elec-
tions on the grounds of the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, 
which banned Hamas from running in 1996. Its provisions stipulated 
that, “candidates, parties and coalitions…[that] commit or advocate 
racism, or pursue the implementation by unlawful or undemocratic 
means” were ineligible to participate in the election.81 With citizens 
questioning whether their country should wait passively for an arch-
enemy who fights for their destruction to be handed the keys to the 
Palestinian government,82 Israel decided to stop the transfer of the 
monthly $60 million of tax revenues it collects on behalf of the PA for 
merchandise destined for Gaza and the West Bank.83
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The U.S. acted in a similar manner. Economically, it imposed strict 
guidelines on all Palestinian recipients of American assistance directed 
by USAID in order to ensure that none goes to Hamas, the Hamas-led 
PA, or to any group affiliated with the movement, regardless of their 
record on service delivery or transparency. All Palestinians who receive 
USAID grants are now obliged to sign an anti-terror certificate, check 
beneficiaries against published lists of international terrorists, and sub-
mit names to further inspection by American government institutions. 
Moreover, any entities that contained the word “martyr” in their name 
would be ineligible to receive aid.84 Any bank that agreed to collabo-
rate with the Hamas-run PA would be blacklisted by the U.S. govern-
ment.85 Politically, the response was isolation and the subjection of any 
further negotiation with Hamas to the conditions enumerated by the 
Quartet (renunciation of violence, recognition of the state of Israel and 
of the agreements signed by the PLO).
As for the European Union, although it followed the American 
example and discontinued direct and indirect donor subventions to 
the PA’s Single Treasury Account, it did not wholly suspend political 
relations and was the main driving force behind the creation of the 
Temporary International Mechanism (TIM). The TIM was set up in 
June 2006 to channel humanitarian aid to the Palestinians by circum-
venting the Hamas-led PA. Indeed this was a much needed plan, for 
the socioeconomic situation in Gaza had severely deteriorated by the 
end of 2006. According to the United Nations:
the PA fiscal crisis resulted in an estimated decline of more than $500 
million in Palestinian household income in the first half of 2006. As a 
result, real per-capita consumption levels declined by about 12 percent, 
with food consumption down by 8 percent…relative to the first half of 
2005. This increased the number of deep poor from an average of 650,800 in 
second-half 2005, to an average of 1,069,200 in first-half 2006—a 64.3 percent 
increase [emphasis in the original]. The individual deep poverty rate 
climbed from 17.3 to 27.5 percent as between the two periods.86
By February 2007, after a year of more or less violent interludes 
between Fatah and Hamas that left Palestinian institutions quasi-para-
lyzed, the British charity Oxfam concluded that:
Two thirds of Palestinians now live in poverty, a rise of 30 percent last 
year. The number of families unable to get enough food has risen by 
14 percent…The health system is disintegrating…[and] public servants 
Macalester International  Vol. 20
40
are worst hit…their poverty rate has risen from 35 percent in 2005, to 71 
percent in 2006.87
In this context, the EU disbursed circa $140 million throughout 2006 
to the TIM and the European Commission released a report in which 
it asserted that 80% of the civilian employees of the PA were to receive 
monthly allowances of $350.88 In fact, according to The Economist, the 
humanitarian aid sent to Gaza and the West Bank in 2006 totalled $1.2 
billion, a 10 percent increase from 2005, which worryied international 
development workers because people were becoming more and more 
dependent on aid.89 On the political side, despite adopting a similar 
policy to that of the U.S., the EU was more nuanced in its tone and 
more pragmatic on the ground, with Israeli officials complaining about 
low-level meetings between EU consular staff and Hamas members.90
D. Palestinian Perceptions
With Gaza and the West Bank crumbling under international sanc-
tions, how did Palestinians respond to the U.S. and EU measures? The 
answer to this question is quite surprising. On the one hand, there was 
widespread condemnation that the U.S. and EU were being inconsis-
tent in their quest for democratization in the region, and the overall 
atmosphere was one of hopelessness. Regarding USAID anti-terror 
certificates, the dean of the Islamic University in Gaza complained that, 
“the Americans asked us to sign a form opposing terrorism. We said 
we don’t support terror and said send your auditors, but we weren’t 
going to humiliate ourselves.”91 Even USAID officials recognized that 
the restrictions were not serving their purpose, as they are “self-defeat-
ing and just sow bad blood.”92 Indeed, “the morale in Palestine was 
that the…failure of powerful forces to accept democracy’s result causes 
instability.”93 According to the head of a Bethlehem-based Palestinian 
NGO, the U.S. and EU were “sending the message that if you want our 
money, vote for Fatah.”94 A Christian voter voiced his frustration with 
the Americans and Europeans: “I’m angry with the donors. All their 
sanctions are doing is weakening the population, not Hamas.”95
This was indeed true, for as soon as it became clear that the West 
was going to suspend all aid to the PA, Hamas exploited the situation 
to garner support. One Hamas activist acknowledged that, “the aid 
boycott is good for us because though America says it has declared 
war on terrorism, we say it is a war against Muslims.”96 From his 
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Israeli prison cell, an Islamist militant lashed out against the donors: 
they “have ruined our house with their funds—they are the source of 
our corruption. We don’t need their Euros. We need our dignity.”97 Per-
haps most strikingly, even when the aid came from the TIM, individual 
recipients in the territories were convinced that it was actually the PA 
that was responsible for these humanitarian efforts. According to a 
European diplomat who interviewed TIM civilian beneficiaries, he was 
unable to convince them that the sums deposited directly into their 
bank accounts through this scheme were provided by the EU, “because 
they kept insisting the payments came from the government.”98
Moreover, sharp criticisms against the U.S. and EU were voiced in 
the regional press. The Saudi-Arabian newspaper Al-Watan wrote on 
April 30, 2006, that the way in which the Palestinian people were going 
to be treated is “the harshest type of political punishment for their 
democratic choice.”99 In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood decreed that, 
“the Western countries are known for their double standards. Domesti-
cally, they practice democracy. But abroad, they practice it only to the 
extent to which it serves their interests.”100 In Turkey, Prime Minister 
Recep Tayip Erdogan concluded that, “if the intention was to disci-
pline the new structure in Palestine through economic methods,” this 
would only bring “controlled democracy, a stance that disregards the 
Palestinians.”101
Nevertheless, in spite of all these accusations against the U.S. and 
EU, the Palestinians perceived the two donors in different lights. In 
March 2006, a survey conducted by Near East Consulting revealead 
that after the decision to suspend aid to the new Hamas-led PA had 
been taken, 17.1 percent of Palestinians politically trusted the EU and 
only 1.6 percent trusted the U.S. Moreover, 37 percent believed that 
the Europeans had a more just policy towards the Palestinians while 
only 2 percent thought that the U.S. adopted a fairer stance.102 Even 
commentators who contest the role of the EU in promoting democracy 
in the Middle East concluded that, “Europe escaped the opprobrium 
of America’s democracy promotion efforts.”103 Hence, we can see that 
while Europe was subject to the identical criticism as the United States, 
it managed NOT to fall from grace with the Palestinians. How could 
this be?
One critical answer reveals itself if we go back to where this essay 
began, namely, to the comparison of the NSS and ESS, two documents 
that outline how the United States and European Union perceive the 
threats to their security and the ways they plan to defend themselves. 
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In the NSS, America is imperiled by a vicious alliance of terrorists 
and dictators who seek to use weapons of mass destruction against 
the free world. To tackle this problem, the U.S. should sustain a vig-
orous campaign to promote democracy worldwide, for since demo-
cratic nations are less likely to go to war against one another, and 
offer a voice to groups that are otherwise alienated from politics, more 
democracy means less terrorism and this makes America more secure. 
Most importantly, democracy is presented as a universal value, a way 
of life that people in all countries and all cultures would embrace if 
they were given the opportunity to make a choice. Consequently, in 
the NSS view, democracy is an axiomatic category, removed from con-
ceptual ambiguity. It is a panacea against the evils that today endanger 
America.
Yet, as we have seen, when confronted with the practicalities of 
democracy promotion, these aims become instrumentalized. As the 
Hamas example demonstrates, fostering democracy can backfire and 
even collide with the goal of enhancing security. Yes, the Palestin-
ians voted in free and fair elections, but those who won the elections 
appear to be commited to the destruction of America’s allies (in this 
case Israel). Consequently, the U.S. refuses to cooperate with the popu-
larly elected government in what constitutes a radical departure from 
the core tenets of the NSS. True, the 2006 version does mention that 
Hamas must fulfill other criteria to be deemed a legitimate partner by 
the U.S, but this document was written after Hamas won the election 
and the American position had already been formulated. In the 2002 
version, such qualifications are nonexistent. Moreover, the 2006 NSS 
specifies that America’s principles are fixed, but the tactics will vary. 
Yet even these tactics must display some degree of consistency so they 
cannot to be misinterpreted as double standards. Clearly, this was not 
the case.
As for the ESS, the document identified a wider variety of threats 
and acknowledged the role that democracy plays in containing them. 
Far from being dogmatic about democracy, however, the ESS is char-
acterized by the predominance of technical terms over ideological 
formulations. In fact, there is little espousal of any political creed in 
the document, except for the belief in the role of the EU in making 
Europe prosperous, peaceful, and free, and of the call for Europe to 
play a greater role in world politics. Most significantly, the EU’s under-
standing of democracy promotion takes the form of advancing good 
governance, a term which even though is not exempted from concep-
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tual blurriness, is far less politically loaded. Taking this into account 
together with the much more limited ambit of the EU’s area of action—
unlike the NSS, the ESS focuses on Europe’s immediate vicinity—and 
the Union’s preference for nuance and dialogue over isolation, we may 
begin to understand why the Palestinians regarded it as a much more 
trustworthy partner than the United States, even though the EU was 
subject to the same accusations.
IV. Democracy, Security, Peace?
If we accept the validity of the argument that how one speaks about 
promoting democracy as a foreign policy objective plays a central 
role in determining the flexibility of policy options as well as the way 
in which they are perceived, it follows that the notion of spreading 
democracy in the Middle East must be reconsidered on two levels. 
First, with respect to the U.S., I will dig deeper into the conceptual 
framework of the NSS and see whether the American failure in Pal-
estine is illustrative of greater policy deficiencies. Regarding the EU, I 
will examine whether the focus on good governance, which translated 
into greater popular support, had any impact on the effectiveness of 
its policies. Second, I will integrate my argument within a broader 
theoretical dimension and show how this intellectual endeavor has 
enriched my understanding of globalization, a concept that lies at the 
heart of Macalester’s program in Maastricht. The next section aims to 
fulfill the first task while the conclusion will respond to the second.
A. Unintended Consequences
The argument put forward in this essay bears worrisome implications 
for both the United States and the European Union. For the U.S., it 
clearly underscores the drawbacks of talking about spreading democ-
racy in a quasi-religious terminology that (1) puts a straitjacket on 
the flexibilty of American policies; (2) is conducive for accusations of 
inconsistency from those whose lives are supposed to be improved 
by American efforts; and (3) often leads to confusion about the role of 
democracy in conflict resolution and state building. This was certainly 
the case with the Palestinians during the violent struggles of 2006, 
as both Hamas and Fatah claimed they were fighting for democracy. 
The former asserted that it was defending its democratically gained 
mandate against “putchists in league with Washington,” while the lat-
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ter argued that it was engaged in a struggle to defend the pluralistic 
nature of society.104 Indeed, this appears to be the result of a major 
shortcoming in American neoconservative thinking, namely, the jux-
taposition of the lessons from one particular (though very important) 
historical period to a wholly different one on the grounds of their 
universality: if democracy was quintessential to the American victory 
in the Cold War over the Soviets, democracy could also save the world 
from terrorism and if promoted in the Middle East and elsewhere, it 
would increase America’s security. As one scholar noted (and as the 
previous section has shown), “the problem with this conception is that 
it ignores the possibility that democratization in the Arab world may 
have a number of outcomes unpalatable to the U.S.”105 Indeed, this has 
happened in the past in other parts of the world and is now happening 
in Palestine. In the 1980s, the Reagan Administration put much effort 
in setting up the infrastructure for a credible election in El Salvador, 
but also covertly funneled money to its protégé, Jose Napoleon Duarte, 
to make sure he was victorious.106 Similarly, in 2006 in Gaza and the 
West Bank, the U.S.—like the EU—did not attempt to push for condi-
tions for Hamas’ participation in the polls for fear of being accused 
of thwarting democracy. Instead they concentrated on the post-elec-
tion reality and underscored that cooperation with Hamas would only 
take place under strict observation of the Quartet’s criteria.107 What 
these two examples have in common is that in both cases democracy 
is presented as an end (just like in the NSS), but the way in which the 
U.S. acted made it just look like an instrument in America’s panoply of 
foreign policy tools.
B. More Democracy = More Security?
The proposition that democracy makes America (or any other coun-
try) more secure can be challenged not only on theoretical grounds, 
but also on empirical ones. The NSS argues that incorporation into a 
democratic polity will resolve the causes that lead young people in 
oppressed societies to join terrorist groups. But this claim does not 
seem to survive the test of history. First, as examples from Turkey, 
Jordan, and Israel illustrate, armed groups can be integrated into the 
political system only if a strong imbalance of power on the domestic 
political stage ensures sufficient checks and balances to dissuade such 
movements from resorting to violence.108 In the absence of political 
constraints, electoral legitimacy does not translate into pacifist politics. 
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Second, a brief glance at the list of terrorist acts annually published 
by the U.S. government shows no correlation between the number 
of attacks and the nature of the political systems in which they were 
perpetrated. According to the State Department’s annual Patterns of 
Global Terrorism, of the major terror incidents that occurred worldwide 
between 2000 and 2003, 269 happened in countries classified as “free” 
by Freedom House, 119 in countries that were “partly free,” and 138 
in states considered “not free.”109 In addition, of the terror acts that 
occurred in free states, India, the world’s largest democracy, accounted 
for 203 (75 percent), in contrast to China, the world’s most populated 
authoritarian state, which did not have a single act on the list.110
C. Promting Democracy = Promoting Regime Change?
A further point that illustrates the conceptual ambiguity created by 
making democracy promotion a national security objective is the extent 
to which it becomes confused with regime change. This pitfall was sig-
nalled both by academics and by practitioners. According to Thomas 
Carothers, “regime change policies in which the U.S. government seeks 
to oust foreign governments hostile to U.S. interests, whether through 
military force [as with Saddam Hussein in Iraq] or economic pressure 
[as with Hamas?] fail to gain international legitimacy and contaminate 
democracy promotion” when they are presented as efforts on behalf of 
democratization.111 Gareth Evans, former Australian Foreign Minister, 
argues that in promoting democracy, “modesty is the best policy.”112 
Specifically, this means not including the spread of democracy in a 
country’s National Security Strategy, especially “if it involves regime 
change: it is particularly counterproductive for those democrats around 
the region trying to work for change from within.”113
D. Good Governance and Double Standards
In comparison to the NSS, we have seen that the ESS barely mentions 
democracy and instead focuses on good governance. On the one hand, 
this has meant that Palestinians have a better impression of the EU, 
which in their eyes appears a more just international actor than the U.S. 
On the other hand, they have also criticized the Union for the same rea-
sons, namely, double standards and inconsistency.114 Are these accusa-
tions legitimate? The answer is both yes and no. As shown in the ESS, 
the EU never spoke about promoting democracy in the same canonical 
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language as the United States and was more inclined toward dialogue 
with the Palestinians, who viewed it as a more reliable partner. How-
ever, commentators speculate that the reason for this choice was not 
necessarily the realization that a more modest tone is a better policy, 
but the conviction that promoting stability is a much more precious 
goal. This is because spreading democracy may result in the short-
run in political turmoil. Since this would take place around Europe’s 
borders, it would imperil the Union’s security.115 Thus, the original 
impetus for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (and to a large extent 
for the 2003 launched ENP) was less about spurring reform than about 
boosting security, as “money flowed to buy stability rather than lay the 
groundwork for change.”116
E. Good Governance, Democracy, and Stability
The way in which the U.S. and EU approach the contradiction between 
democracy and stability reveals another difference between them. On 
the one hand, the U.S. opted in favor of the former, as Secretary of State 
Rice condemned the past American option in favor of the latter. Speak-
ing at the American University in Cairo, she declared that, “for sixty 
years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense 
of democracy in this region, here in the Middle East—and we achieved 
neither. Now we are taking a different course. We are supporting the 
democratic aspirations of all people.”117 As we have seen, this asser-
tion is as difficult to operationalize as it is easy to contest. On the other 
hand, the ESS clearly states that in the age of globalization, geography 
still counts. Therefore, the EU’s accent on stability is conditioned by a 
factor that for the US is irrelevant: proximity.”118 As a result, Europe 
may have deliberately chosen to speak the language of good gover-
nance, which is far less suspicious of political arriere pensées that betray 
plans to enact regime change. Finally, it may well be the case that EU 
policymakers have realized it might be difficult for the Union to seek 
to advance democracy when it itself cannot be conceived as such.119
Setting the issue of democracy promotion aside, how effective has 
Europe been at promoting good governance, the stated goal of the 
ESS? In this particular instance, the accusations of inconsistency do not 
ring hollow. According to Richard Youngs, the EU’s decision to follow 
the U.S. and suspend aid to the Hamas-led Palestinian government 
contradicted its own policy of pressing for a more parliamentary style 
of government in the Palestinian territories by switching its support 
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from the legislature to the President, Abu Mazen.120 Moreover, the 
TIM bypasses good governance mechanisms such as the Palestinian 
Single Treasury Account and “diplomats complain of money draining 
‘in a black hole.’ ”121 In the words of a former Palestinian Interior Minis-
ter, “the Europeans have transformed transparency and accountability 
into a sacred principle, but this is happening under their noses and 
with their support and they say nothing.”122 Consequently, we come 
to the paradoxical conclusion that while Europe’s emphasis on good 
governance and lack of dogmatism has made it seem more dependable 
in the eyes of Palestinians, its record is not a promising one.
V. Link with Globalization and Conclusion
I started this essay with the motivation that examining American and 
European policies to promote democracy is a good way to assess the 
extent to which they will adopt similar positions on issues such as Iraq 
in the future. Though the particular nature of the problems (and that 
of the people whose job it will be to solve them) will always be a decid-
ing factor in determining whether the U.S. and EU stand side by side, 
this study detects some underlying patterns. On the one hand, the NSS 
and the American government’s reaction to Hamas’ victory illustrates 
that the U.S. advances democracy as a universal good and perceives 
this effort to be in direct correlation with bolstering the security of 
the American people. The previous sections explored the drawbacks 
of this approach, which in the case of Palestine resulted in a loss of 
credibility. On the other hand, the EU speaks less about spreading 
democracy and underscores the importance of good governance. This 
policy option has yielded mixed results: yes, Europe is regarded as a 
more sincere partner by the Palestinians, but its record on advancing 
good governance is quite inconsistent and may be the result of a delib-
erate calculation to favor stability over change. This shows that how 
one speaks about promoting democracy or good governance matters, 
and a more flexible stance offers more policy options. In this last sec-
tion, I relate these insights to the concept of globalization, which was 
explored in depth in the January seminar and throughout the duration 
of the Maastricht program.
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A. After Theory, Empirics
There are a number of ways in which this project has enhanced my 
knowledge of globalization. First, researching how America and 
Europe think about promoting democracy has added an empirical 
component to the definitions of this concept that were explored during 
the January seminar. For instance, we learned that Nederveen Pieterse 
likens globalization to a prism in which major disputes over the col-
lective human condition, such as questions of capitalism, inequality, 
power, development, and identity, are refracted.123 Indeed, the NSS and 
ESS, as well as the way in which American and European policymak-
ers reacted to Hamas’ electoral victory, reflect efforts to grapple with a 
variety of dilemmas about human existence which confirm the validity 
of Pieterese’s argument. Among them, the following three interroga-
tions emerge as prominent:
•  Are there such things as universal values? For the United States, the 
guarantee of democracy as the sole political system that can ensure 
a happy and secure life is unequivocal. As shown above, nowhere 
do American policymakers question this tenet or the way it might 
be understood by people with different political cultures. On the 
other hand, we can speculate that the EU’s choice to promote good 
governance over democracy reflects that the Union is more cogni-
zant of the fact that such an enterprise can lead to controversy, and 
that a more technical policy formulation can avoid this pitfall.
•  How does one relate to history? America and Europe have developed 
different answers to this quandary, which appear to be correlated 
with their power status in the world. The NSS reveals that the U.S. 
is fully aware of its unparalled position of strengh in the world and 
plans to exploit it in order to advance its own political vision. In 
this sense, the document reveals that the current American admin-
istration is convinced the U.S. must chose to either make history or 
“be made” by history (a possibility that is equated with decline). In 
contrast, the ESS has a regional scope and is focused primarily on 
securing a stable environment in which Europe can prosper. His-
tory is something to be made only if Europe manages to translate its 
“presence” in world politics into greater “actorness” (i.e., enhancing 
the coherence and consistency of the EU’s external relations), a posi-




•  What is the relationship between agency, structure, and change? This 
was a recurrent question in the January seminar as a feature of the 
globalization debate and it is also a leitmotif in this analysis. On the 
one hand, American policymakers hold that democracy is good for 
everyone and the NSS stipulates that in certain cases the United 
States will actively promote democracy, even in a forceful manner. 
The corollary of this argument is that this political system can take 
root in any context, regardless of a people’s cultural and historical 
inheritance. In other words, agency can modify structure. But as I 
have documented, the case of Hamas puts this argument into ques-
tion. On the other hand, the EU seems to be less enthusiastic about 
the role of external agency in implementing democratic change in 
the Middle East. As shown in Section I, Javier Solana, the EU’s for-
eign policy representative, is of the view that each society evolves 
according to its own rhythm and that the way external powers can 
influence this process is through advice, guidance, and dialogue, 
rather than fostering disruptive change.
All of these examples confirm Piertese’s definition of globalization as 
a theoretical locus of grand debates about morals and society because 
they show that in thinking about how to defend their citizens, poli-
cymakers must now tackle a variety of concerns that go far beyond 
immediate security requirements.
B. The Globalization of Security
While studying the NSS and ESS, I became more aware of the degree to 
which the notion of globalization and the realities it encompasses have 
become a matter of interest in areas of human activity that are very dif-
ferent from academia. In Section I, this essay showed how the plans to 
promote democracy and good governance evolved as a response to cer-
tain conceptions of the world, which then led policymakers to believe 
that spreading democracy or good governance would be conducive to 
greater security. The way in which they perceive globalization is cen-
tral to understanding why this has been the case, as both the 2006 NSS 
and the ESS make specific references to the concept. The NSS docu-
ment contains a chapter in which it explicitly recognizes that, “new 
flows of trade, investment, information and technology are transform-
ing national security” because “globalization has exposed us to new 
challenges and changed the way old challenges touch our [American] 
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interests and values.”124 Some of these new provocations include pan-
demics, environmental degradation, and illicit trade, but the NSS still 
holds that, “democracies are better able to deal with these challenges 
than repressive or poorly governed states.”125 For example, “pandem-
ics require fully transparent public health systems which those that 
fear freedom are unable or unwilling to provide.”126 In contrast to the 
idealistic formulations of the NSS, the ESS is more concrete. As out-
lined in Section I, it underscores that even in the era of globalization, 
geography still matters,127 and that it is simultaneously applauded as a 
bestower of prosperity and condemned as a source of frustration and 
injustice.128 These different viewpoints about the impact of globaliza-
tion have made me more conscious of the added value that studying 
this phenomon has brought to my education and of the ways in which 
this knowledge can be applied in a specific professional context.
C. The Impossibility of Isolation
The third lesson that I drew from this project is a corollary of the one 
above: if security has become globalized to such an extent that Ameri-
can and European officials now have to confront issues that surpass tra-
ditional thinking, it follows that endeavors which do not consider the 
implications of globalization will most likely end in failure. This argu-
ment was previously examined during the winter seminar, when we 
learned from Anthony Giddens’ work that globalization can be charac-
terized as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link 
distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by 
events occurring many miles away and vice versa.”129 American and 
European approaches to promote democracy and good governance 
confirm this argument. Indeed, it is truly remarkable to see how much 
of the substance of both the NSS and ESS documents is dedicated to 
developments that are taking place outside of America and Europe—
in Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, Somalia, or North Korea. This reminds 
us of David Held’s prescient observation that, “our world is [becoming 
one] of overlapping communities of fate, where the fate of one country 
and that of another are more entwined than ever before.”130 The fact 
that this essay is concentrating on American and European efforts to 
advance democracy in Palestine is an example of this reality.
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D. Globalization and Empathy (or lack thereof?)
Realizing that globalization has made American and European secu-
rity largely dependent on the security of other countries or regions has 
not necessarily translated into a greater readiness to subject the core 
assumptions that inform U.S. and EU policies to dialogue with foreign 
partners. This seems to be true especially in the case of America’s NSS, 
which in spite of the clear recognition that the U.S. needs to cooperate 
with other countries with the view of prompting democracy and fight-
ing terror, it does not acknowledge that what is meant by democracy 
in the U.S. and how others may conceptualize it can in fact cause dis-
agreements. This position stands in contradiction to the central argu-
ment put forward by Peter Singer in his volume entitled, One World: 
The Ethics of Globalization. According to Singer, the age of globalization 
requires a new ethical approach to human relations because various 
developments in law, economics, and the environment are gradually 
creating a global community whose problems must be addressed on the 
basis of common norms.131 In other words, Singer’s work can be inter-
preted as a call for empathy in communication, which in the context of 
this essay would mean that American policymakers should cultivate a 
much greater “respect for the opinions of mankind” in their efforts to 
promote democracy. True, this prescription could be countered on the 
grounds that their (legitimate) aim is to serve only the national interest 
of the U.S. Yet even from a strategic perspective, this essay has shown 
that the way in which Palestinians reacted to America’s democracy 
promotion policies in the wake of Hamas’ electoral victory reveals that 
a greater preoccupation with understanding diverging viewpoints and 
exercising “soft power” may increase political capital. The EU seems to 
have learned this lesson, as its more nuanced attitude vis-à-vis Hamas 
meant that Palestinians perceived it as a more trustworthy partner.
E. A Final Word: Globalization and “Belongingness”
At the conclusion of the winter seminar on Globalization in Com-
parative Perspective, I realized that although I had lived in Europe for 
most of my life, spending some formative years in the United States 
had disconnected me from the place I thought I called home. This 
feeling caught me off guard. Claiming that part of my experience in 
Maastricht became oriented toward the rediscovery of Europe does not 
appear to me as a presumptuous assertion. Writing this essay was thus 
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an important step in making this endeavor fulfilling because apart 
from the academic work, it also offered me the opportunity to confront 
my images of America and Europe simultaneously, and revisit my 
sentiments about their roles in the world. In this sense, it was for the 
first time that I became fully aware of the European Union’s complexity 
as a political entity and that the destiny of my country, Romania, will 
be dramatically affected by the EU’s future evolution. Thus, one last 
lesson about globalization that I take with me is that in a time when 
we are increasingly exposed to different cultures, when our values 
and identities are swinging between hybridism and the rejection of the 
other, understanding globalization is a difficult task without exploring 
more profoundly one’s own search for belonging. •
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